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1  INTRODUCTION
This note deals with the decisions handed down by the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR, the Commission) in 2004 as 
published in the African Human Rights Law Reports.1 The note forms part of 
a series of comments on the Commission’s case law published in the Forum 
section of Law Democracy & Development.2 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights decided a total of 
12 communications in 2004. Four communications were found to be inad-
missible, while nine proceeded to a decision on the merits. In addition, one 
file was closed when the communication was withdrawn by the petitioner, as 
the issues raised in the petition appeared to be in the process of resolution 
within the domestic jurisdiction.3 The decision on the first inter-state commu-
nication to be decided by the Commission is also covered in this commen-
tary. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda was 
decided in 2003, but only published by the Commission in 2004.4
It is proposed to discuss the communications according to the issues that 
arise at the admissibility stage and thereafter at the merits stage.
2  ADMISSIBILITY
Article 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter) sets out the criteria that communications must meet in order for 
1 The Reports can be downloaded from http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/ahrlr/ahrlr.html
2 Killander M‘Communications before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1988–
2002’ (2006) 10(1) Law, Democracy and Development 101–117; Lim H & Ramaroson M ‘Like a 
candle in the wind: Commentary on the communications decided by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 10(2) Law, Democracy and Development 101–121.
3 B v Kenya (2004) AHRLR 67 (ACHPR 2004)
4 (2004) AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2004)
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them to be admissible.5 The admissibility test consists of seven criteria. The 
criterion most often emphasised on by the Commission, and the basis on 
which the decisions of admissibility most often turn is the exhaustion of local 
remedies. In the Commission’s decisions in 2004, the majority of findings of 
inadmissibility were grounded on the non-exhaustion of local remedies. In 
two cases, non-exhaustion of local remedies was alleged in addition to the 
non-fulfilment of other criteria.6 With regard to decisions declared admissi-
ble, exhaustion of local remedies was contested in three cases, but complain-
ants were able to successfully argue to the contrary.7
2.1  Exhaustion of local remedies
The complaint in Miss A v Cameroon8 relates to the arrest and indefinite de-
tention of persons, where no charges or trial is conducted soon after their 
arrest. The complainant alleged that the detainees had never been formally 
charged, never appeared in court and had never had access to a lawyer. Such 
indefinite detention tends to violate the right to liberty, the right to be prompt-
ly brought before a judicial officer and at least one of the tenets of the right 
to fair trial, that an arrested person should be tried within a reasonable time.9 
Several constitutions of African countries provide a maximum time (usually 
48 hours) within which detained persons must be brought before a competent 
court.10 The Constitution of Cameroon is, however, not one of these.
In the course of exchanging correspondence on the case, the state informed 
the Commission that the detainees had been acquitted for ‘lack of criminal 
charges’ and ‘for non-proven facts’.11 The position was confirmed by the com-
plainant, who indicated the possibility of negotiating with the state on the is-
5 African Charter art 56 ‘Communications relating to human and peoples’ rights referred to in article 
55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they: 
 1.  Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity, 
 2.  Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Char-
ter,
 3.  Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the state concerned and its 
institutions or to the Organization of African Unity,
 4.  Are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media,
 5.  Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly 
prolonged,
 6.  Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from 
the date the Commission is seized of the matter, and
 7.  Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these states involved in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.’
6 Bakweri Lands Claims Committee v Cameroon (2004) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2004) and B v Kenya (n 3 
above)
7 Odjouriby v Benin (2004) AHRLR 15 (ACHPR 2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v Burundi, 
Rwanda and Uganda (n 4 above), Interights and Others v Mauritania (2004) AHRLR 87 (ACHPR 
2004)
8 (2004) AHRLR 39 (ACHPR 2004) 
9 African Charter arts 6, 7(1)(d)
10 Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia (72 
hours), Ghana, Kenya (24 hours, or for capital offences 14 days), Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Namibia, Nigeria (1 day or more depending on the distance of the competent court from the deten-
tion area), Seychelles (24 hours), Sierra Leone (72 hours, or for capital offences 10 days), Somalia, 
South Africa, Swaziland and Uganda.
11 Para 15
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sue of compensation for the detentions.12 The Commission held that the trial 
and subsequent acquittal of the detainees was evidence of the availability of 
local remedies and also that the communication had been submitted before 
these remedies had been exhausted,13 even though the complainant did not 
disclose any efforts that had been made to exhaust local remedies.14
The Commission found that one avenue for redress that may have been 
open to the complainant was an application for habeas corpus, an order for 
the production of the detained persons before court. As it turned out, the trial 
and acquittal of the detainees was completed before the Commission consid-
ered the case on admissibility. Even though the complainant had stated in 
the complaint that the detainees had ‘never been formally charged, they [had] 
never appeared in court and never had access to a lawyer’,15 the Commission 
noted that the case was submitted to the Commission while it was ‘still before 
the courts’.16 It is not clear where the Commission derived this fact from given 
the complainant’s allegations. Further, while it is not evident that the com-
plainant had exhausted all recourse available, the Commission’s conclusion 
that the fact that ‘the case was tried properly before a court of law shows the 
availability of local remedies’ appears to be premature. The Commission has 
declared remedies to be ‘available’ where a petitioner can pursue the remedy 
without impediment.17 If the complainant’s allegation that the detainees were 
arrested and never arraigned before a court is true, it is a possibility that the 
only reason why the trial took place was because the Commission was seized 
of the matter. It is open to question whether this would be sufficient basis on 
which to declare that local remedies were available.
In the Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon,18 where the alienation 
of land which would result in the extinguishment of title was at issue, the 
non-exhaustion of local remedies, which had been raised in addition to other 
objections to admissibility, ultimately was the basis on which the decision of 
inadmissibility of the communication was made. The complainant from the 
outset acknowledged the non-exhaustion of local remedies, but sought to 
justify this non-exhaustion by relying on the exception ‘unless it is obvious 
that this procedure is unduly prolonged’ a stipulated in article 56(5);19 as well 
as the Commission’s jurisprudence against application of the exhaustion of 
local remedies rule where it was impractical or undesirable to do so.20 The 
justification consisted in illustrating the futility of taking the matter through 




14 Paras 9, 11
15 Para 3
16 Para 25
17 Jawara v The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000) para 32
18 See (fn 6 above).
19 Para 24
20 Ibid, citing Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 1995) para 
37
21 Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (fn 6 above) para 26
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The Commission has often stated that the exhaustion of local remedies is 
necessary, inter alia, so that the state respondent in the communication has 
notice of the allegations made against it. Bringing a complaint to the domestic 
adjudicative mechanisms also ensures that the Commission is not placed in 
the position of a court of first instance. The Bakweri Land Claims Committee 
(BLCC) explained at length that all the attempts made to petition the govern-
ment on this issue constituted sufficient notice of its existence. Further, that 
the discretionary manner in which judicial decisions are adhered to or not, 
as well as the extraordinary powers the President of Cameroon wields over 
the judiciary, was ample evidence of the impracticability of pursuing local 
remedies.22 The lack of progress from the various efforts attempted to resolve 
the complaint, it was argued, ‘suggest[s] that remedies either do not exist or 
cannot be effective in the complainant’s situation and in any event, their ap-
plication is being increasingly prolonged’.23
In response to these explanations, the Commission reiterated that while 
the requirement under article 56(5) should be interpreted liberally to allow 
all cases in which the complainants have attempted to exhaust local rem-
edies, the attempt to exhaust local remedies consists in approaching local 
or national judicial bodies.24 The complainants had repeatedly attempted to 
obtain redress through political/administrative means, but had not once ap-
proached the courts for resolution. The Commission found, rightly so, that it 
could not rely on the complainant’s subjective assessments of the independ-
ence or otherwise of the judiciary to conclude the unavailability of effective 
remedies in Cameroon. 
The wisdom of this position was illustrated in Kenya Section of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists and Others v Kenya,25 where the complain-
ants were apprehensive that they would not get a hearing in court due to the 
nature of their complaint and the perceived partiality of the judiciary. These 
fears were subsequently allayed when the complainants were granted stand-
ing before the domestic courts contrary to their expectations. 
The facts of the case were that the Kenya Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists constituted a panel of eminent jurists from the Com-
monwealth to examine the judiciary, and subsequently presented the panel’s 
views to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), established 
by the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, and mandated with the task of col-
lecting and collating the views of Kenyans, and facilitating the review of the 
Constitution. The views expressed by the eminent panel cast the judiciary as 
lacking in independence, incompetent and corruption-ridden, and as failing 
to inspire the confidence of Kenyans. Recommendations were made as to 
how the situation of the judiciary could be improved. 
After publication of the CKRC’s report, two judges, one a High Court judge 




25 (2004) AHRLR 71 (ACHPR 2004)
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proceedings seeking to quash ‘the decision and/or proposals actual or in-
tended and/or recommendations of the CKRC … concerning and touching 
on the Kenyan judiciary’.26 Leave was granted for the judicial review, which 
leave acted as an order barring further proceedings on matters which were the 
subject of the review. The complainants argued that this amounted to deny-
ing Kenyans a new constitution that offered full protection of their human 
rights. They alleged a violation of articles 1, 7(1)(a) and 9(2) of the African 
Charter.27
The respondent state challenged the admissibility of the communication 
on the grounds that the complainants had not exhausted local remedies. On 
their part the complainants alleged that the circumstances of the case ren-
dered the exhaustion of local remedies ‘impossible and inordinately convo-
luted because the judiciary [was] compromised and severely lacking in in-
dependence’.28 They further alleged that they could not expect a fair hearing 
from the judiciary, since the matter had been precipitated by members of the 
judiciary arguably representative of the whole judiciary.29 The complainants 
expressed scepticism at being admitted as interested parties in order to chal-
lenge the suit, and also doubted the likelihood of enforcement of their rights 
before the Court of Appeal, given that one of the applicants for judicial review 
on behalf of the judiciary was a judge of the Court of Appeal.30
Subsequent to making these submissions, the complainants approached 
the High Court in Kenya and were granted leave to join the suit as interested 
parties. The respondent state also took measures to investigate allegations 
of unethical conduct within the judiciary, providing an opportunity for the 
complainants to pursue local remedies. This eventuality illustrates clearly 
the merits inherent in the position that the Commission adopted; against ac-
cepting a complainant’s mere apprehension as to the ineffectiveness of local 
remedies as reason to exempt exhaustion of these remedies.31
In the case of Interights & Another v Nigeria32 the Commission delivered a 
finding of inadmissibility for non-exhaustion of local remedies, following a 
lack of response by the complainants to repeated requests for written sub-
missions on admissibility.33 The lack of response was interpreted as a failure 
to show whether local remedies had been exhausted. Loss of contact with 
the complainant has in previous cases been reason for a finding of inadmis-
26 Para 9
27 Para 14. Art 1 (state parties undertaking to recognise rights in the Charter and to take measures to 
give effect to rights); art 7(1)(a) (appeal to competent national organs against acts violating rights); 





32 (2004) AHRLR 102 (ACHPR 2004)
33 Para 16
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sibility.34 There is no consistency as to how many attempts should be made 
to contact the complainant or what time period should be allowed before 
the complaint is declared inadmissible.35 Given the telecommunication chal-
lenges that exist on the continent, it may be useful for the Commission to set 
out guidelines to be followed before a communication is declared inadmis-
sible for loss of contact.
In several cases, the complainants were found to have exhausted local 
remedies and, therefore, their cases were admitted. In Odjouoriby v Benin,36 
the complaint was against the judiciary, which institution, according to the 
Commission, should be approached for the exhaustion of local remedies. The 
complainant alleged that an appeal filed with the Appeal Court in September 
1995 had not been disposed by the time the Commission was seized of the 
matter in April 1997. The complainant therefore found himself alleging the 
same set of facts as both a violation of his rights, as well as the basis for ex-
emption from exhausting local remedies. 
In the absence of any rebuttal by the respondent state, the Commission ac-
cepted that the procedure for exhausting local remedies was unduly prolonged 
and as such the complaint was admissible. Even after receiving supplemental 
information on the case and subsequent steps that had been taken to pros-
ecute the case, the Commission still held the respondent state responsible 
for the administration of justice in Benin. This was in keeping with the Com-
missions jurisprudence that stipulates that the onus is on the state to show 
that local remedies had not been exhausted.37 The same rationale formed the 
basis on which the complaint in Women’s Legal Aid Centre (on behalf of Moto) 
v Tanzania was declared admissible.38 The state did not refute the allegation 
that the complainant was precluded from approaching the Court of Appeal 
of Tanzania.
The question of exhaustion of local remedies in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,39 case was held not to arise 
because the violations took place within the territory of the complaining state 
and as such domestic remedies did not exist.40 The rationale often stated by 
the Commission for the exhaustion of local remedies is the need to bring the 
violations to the attention of the violating state through its judicial organs.41 
34 See Union des Scolaires Nigeriens and Another v Niger (2000) AHRLR 176 (ACHPR 1994); Buyingo 
v Uganda (2000) AHRLR 320 (ACHPR 1995); Baes v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995); Com-
mittee for the Defence of Human Rights (on behalf of Madike) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 183 (ACHPR 
1995); Dumbuya v The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 103 (ACHPR 1995); Dioumessi and Others v Guinea 
(2000) AHRLR 130 (ACHPR 1995); Joana v Madagascar (2000) AHRLR 141 (ACHPR 1996); In-
terights (on behalf of Sikunda) v Namibia (2002) AHRLR 21 (ACHPR 2002); Woods and Another v 
Liberia (2003) AHRLR 125 (ACHPR 2003); Aigbe v Nigeria (2003) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2003).
35 Compare several reminders in Interights and Another v Nigeria and Union des Scolaires Nigeriens 
and Another v Niger with two reminders in Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (on behalf of 
Madike) v Nigeria and Dumbuya v The Gambia.
36 See (fn 7 above).
37 Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia (2000) AHRLR 321 (ACHPR 
1996)
38 (2004) AHRLR 116 (ACHPR 2004)
39 See (fn 4 above).
40 Para 63
41 See Jawara v The Gambia (fn 17 above).
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In this case, the judicial systems of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda would 
have no jurisdiction to address violations within the territory of DRC.
In line with the Commission’s jurisprudence in cases where mass violations 
of human rights had taken place,42 the communication brought on behalf of 
Sierra Leonean refuges against Guinea, was declared admissible.43 Domestic 
remedies were deemed unavailable due to the life-threatening situation that 
refugees found themselves in. The fact of violations affecting a large number 
of refugees, as well as the mass deportations of refugees made it impractica-
ble to exhaust domestic remedies. 
The complainants in Interights & Others v Mauritania44 case approached 
the Commission to contest the proscription of the main opposition politi-
cal party in Mauritania. The party was allegedly dissolved by the authorities 
citing action taken by the party’s leadership that was damaging to the good 
image and interests of the country and the incitement of Mauritanians to vio-
lence and intolerance, threatening public order, peace and security. 
Although the political party contested this action in the Administrative 
Chamber of the Supreme Court, the respondent contended that there was 
the possibility of applying for a review of the unfavourable decision made by 
the Court, and as such, the complainants had not exhausted local remedies. 
The Commission held that the remedies expected to be exhausted are ‘the 
ordinary remedies of common law that exist in jurisdictions and normally 
accessible to people seeking justice’.45 Revision of judgment was considered 
a remedy of exceptional nature as it exists only if certain set-out conditions 
are met.46
The non-exhaustion of local remedies continues to be the prominent stum-
bling block to the admissibility of cases before the African Commission. The 
Commission’s jurisprudence has amply elaborated on what is meant by local 
remedies, what is entailed in exhausting them and what the exceptions are 
to the rule. The communications discussed above have applied this jurispru-
dence. On the one hand, the cases illustrate the difficulties that complain-
ants encounter in their efforts to find redress at the domestic level, often the 
frustrations emanating from the judiciary which is central to exhausting local 
remedies. On the other hand, the importance of attempting to exhaust do-
mestic remedies is highlighted in the number of cases where no efforts were 
made by the complainant, only to subsequently find that the state was pre-
pared to resolve the issue without the communication going to hearing. The 
Commission, by insisting on the exhaustion of local remedies in these cases, 
in accordance with its jurisprudence, maintained its position as a suprana-
tional body and not a court of first instance.
42 Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia (fn 37 above)
43 African Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) 
v Guinea (2004) AHRLR 57 (ACHPR 2004)
44 See (fn 7 above).
45 Interights and Others v Mauritania (fn 7 above) para 27
46 Paras 28, 29
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2.2  Other admissibility criteria
Other than the exhaustion of local remedies, the African Charter prescribes 
that communications may be admissible upon fulfilment of certain other cri-
teria. Of these other criteria, the Commission decided on objections relating 
to the presence of insulting language in the communication, consideration of 
the complaint by another international body, and submission of complaint 
within reasonable time. In addition, one communication was found inadmis-
sible due to loss of contact with the complainant.47
The state’s objection to admissibility based on article 56(3) in the Bak-
weri case, alleged that the suspicions of the judiciary’s lack of independence 
amounted to insulting and disparaging language, and on that basis the com-
munication should be declared inadmissible.48 Though the Commission has 
encountered this objection in various communications,49 it is yet to clearly 
delineate what constitutes disparaging and/or insulting language as contem-
plated by article 56(3). In Ilesanmi v Nigeria the Commission found that dis-
paraging and insulting language must be aimed at ‘undermining the integrity 
and status of the institution bringing it into disrepute’.50 In the Bakweri case, 
the complainant’s allegations of partiality and lack of independence were 
considered to be mere allegations and an expression of the complainants’ 
perspectives as to how successful their claim would be in local courts. This 
did not amount to disparaging or insulting language.51
The objection relating to article 56(7) was dismissed on the grounds that 
though the complaint had been submitted to the UN Sub-commission, it was 
not decided on the merits.52 The lack of a decision obviates reliance on article 
56(7), whose underlying principle is the ne bis in idem rule, the prevention of 
double jeopardy.53
In Rabah v Mauritania54 the contention that the communication was sub-
mitted after an unduly long time after the exhaustion of local remedies, was 
raised in the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Yasir Sid Ahmad El Hassan. 
Commissioner El Hassan argued that the Commission should have consid-
ered that it took the complainant six years after the conclusion of his case 
in the Supreme Court in Mauritania before he submitted his communication 
to the Commission.55 This unreasonable delay contravened article 56(6) of 
the African Charter. Further, the events around which the communication 
arises took place in 1975 before Mauritania ratified the African Charter in 
47 Interights and Another v Nigeria (fn 32 above)
48 Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (fn 6 above) para 38
49 See e.g. Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v Cameroon (2000) AHRLR 61 (ACHPR 1997); 
Communication 268/2003 Ilesanmi v Nigeria Eighteenth Activity Report 2004–2005 Annex III.
50 Ilesanmi v Nigeria (fn 49 above) para 35
51 Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (fn 6 above) para 48
52 Para 53
53 Para 52
54 (2004) AHRLR 78 (ACHPR 2004)
55 Para 41. The African Charter does not stipulate a time within which the complaint should be brought 
before the Commission after exhaustion of local remedies. 
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June 1986.56 The majority decision examined only the exhaustion of local 
remedies, indeed the respondent was requested to comment on only this as-
pect of admissibility.57 
In the inter-state communication brought by DRC, the respondents’ first 
challenge to admissibility was brought on a procedural issue.58 Uganda and 
Rwanda alleged that the decision by DRC to address the complaint to the 
Commission rather than to them and the Secretary General of the OAU was 
fatal to the admissibility of the claim.59 The Commission disagreed as to the 
fatality of the omission and declared the procedure was meant to promote 
conciliation and was discretionary, thus, DRC was not under any obligation 
to follow it.60 Further, the respondent states were duly informed by the Com-
mission of the complaint against them, another purpose to be achieved by 
the procedure. As such, the option exercised by DRC to bypass the concilia-
tion stage was not fatal to the admission of the complaint, as article 49 of the 
Charter allows for this possibility.
The Commission further confirmed its jurisdiction over humanitarian law 
issues arising in the complaint by citing article 60 and 61 of the African Char-
ter, as well as the right to international and national peace and security af-
firmed in article 23.61 
It is apparent that other admissibility criteria are not as often raised as the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies, and are not as elaborately discussed 
by the Commission. As emerges from the dissenting opinion in the Rabah 
case, a preoccupation with the local remedies rule may also overshadow 
the consideration of other admissibility criteria, and the Commission should 
guard against this.62
3  DECISIONS ON MERIT 
The communications decided on the merits covered a range of alleged viola-
tions of rights. In six of the seven cases decided on merits, the Commission 
found that the respondent states had violated provisions of the African Char-
ter. This section will discuss some of the issues arising from the Commission’s 
decisions.
3.1  Evidence
The Commission is a quasi-judicial body whose findings to communications 
are not binding on states. The nature of the Commission, including the part-
time status of the members, the time allocated to meetings and consideration 
56 The Commission has held communications to be inadmissible where the cause of action arose 
before the African Charter entered into force for the respondent state, and there is no continuing 
violation subsequent to entry into force. See e.g. Njoka v Kenya (2000) AHRLR 132 (AHRLR 1995); 
Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000).
57 Rabah v Mauritania (fn 54 above) para 14




62 See (fn 57 above).
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of communications, as well as its administrative capacity all impinge on its 
ability to thoroughly investigate the issues raised in cases brought before it. 
However, it is not clear how evidence submitted to the Commission affects 
the decisions made. The Commission has previously stated that its role is not 
to evaluate the facts, but rather to see that the process followed does not vio-
late the Charter or the state’s own law.63 The seemingly contradictory stance 
with regard to evidence is illustrated in the cases below.
In African Institute for Human Rights & Development (on behalf of Sierra 
Leonean refugees in Guinea) v Guinea the complainants alleged that following 
a speech by the President of Guinea on 9 September 2000, widespread viola-
tions of human rights were perpetrated against Sierra Leonean refugees living 
in Guinea.64 The President in his speech allegedly proclaimed that Sierra Leo-
nean refugees should be arrested, searched and confined to refugee camps. 
In apparent response to this speech, Guinean soldiers and civilians commit-
ted violations that included looting and extortion of refugees; violence rang-
ing from beatings, rapes, shootings; arrests and detention without just cause; 
widespread rape of Sierra Leonean women and humiliating searches of both 
men and women; and forcible return of the refugees to Sierra Leone where 
they faced the ravages of civil war.65 The complainants produced as evidence 
of their allegations, several affidavits by victims of the acts of discrimination 
against Sierra Leonean refugees.
Guinea responded to the complainant’s allegations by invoking the right 
to defend its territorial integrity, the responsibility for which is vested in the 
President of the Republic. The respondent rejected the allegation that Sierra 
Leonean refugees were discriminated against, stating that the President’s 
speech and measures resorted to by the state were not targeted against Sierra 
Leoneans.66 The respondent state was critical of the evidence by witnesses 
and victims of violations insisting that further evidence of alleged incidents 
should be produced.67 
The Commission, in reaching a decision, appears to have avoided the ques-
tion of adequacy of evidence that was the cornerstone of the respondent’s 
submissions. The respondent contested in particular that Guinean soldiers 
were involved in shootings in front of the Sierra Leone Embassy building.68 
Guinea also requested that the complainants provide a transcript of the Pres-
ident’s speech in order to prove incitement.69 The Commission’s general re-
sponse was that ‘submissions before the Commission led it to believe that the 
evidence and testimonies of eyewitnesses reveal that these events took place 
immediately after the speech of the President of the Republic of Guinea on 9 
September 2000’.70 The Commission then proceeded to find the respondent 
63 See Njoku v Egypt (2000) AHRLR 83 (ACHPR 1997) paras 60, 61.
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in violation of articles 2, 4, 5, 12(5) and 14 of the African Charter and article 4 
of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa 
of 1969.71
The Commission focused more on linking the speech to the violations and 
took for granted that the evidence placed before it was factual. This raises the 
question of standard of proof and to what lengths a complainant should go 
to provide evidence of violations before the Commission. The Commission 
passed up an opportunity to deliberate and pronounce on this issue. 
In Interights & Others v Mauritania, the Commission was implicitly invited 
on the basis of the evidence submitted to decide where the line should be 
drawn between competing rights.72 The purpose for which the complainants 
adduced evidence was to show that although the state did not approve of 
being criticised, the exercise of the party’s freedoms of expression and as-
sociation was not a threat to the state security. The Commission agreed with 
the respondent that the acts attributed to the complainant could have jeop-
ardised the rights of individuals and the collective security of the state, but 
there is no discussion as to the basis on which this decision is arrived at. The 
impression given as a result is that the Commission did weigh the evidence 
adduced, but is not forthcoming on what factors were considered.
In the case of DRC v Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda, violations of looting of 
the natural resources of the complainant state were found on the basis of 
evidence that the Commission had (but presumably not presented by the 
parties).73 The Commission did not confine itself to the evidence presented by 
the parties to come to its conclusions, rather it pro actively utilised relevant 
information submitted to the UN Security Council.74 
3.2  Limitations to rights
The complainants in the case of Interights & Others v Mauritania, alleged 
violations to articles 1, 2, 9(2), 10(1), 13 and 14 of the Charter.75 The Com-
mission considered the evidence proffered by the complainant, as well as that 
of the respondent and eventually made its decision by assessing the extent to 
which rights should be limited. The Commission avoided dwelling at length 
on whether on the facts presented before it, the complainants had indeed tak-
en action ‘damaging to the good image and interests of the country and the 
incitement of Mauritanians to violence and intolerance, threatening public 
order, peace and security’ as alleged by the state. It would appear as though 
this was the thrust of the evidence adduced before it; the complainants seek-
ing to show that the statements and actions by the party leaders were not cal-
71 Para 74. Art 2 (non-discrimination; art 4 (inviolability of the human being); art 5 (dignity, physical 
and moral integrity, prohibition against exploitation and degradation particularly slavery); art 12(5) 
(mass expulsion of non-nationals); art 14 (property); art 4 OAU Refugee Convention (non-discrimi-
nation)
72 See (fn 7 above).
73 See (fn 4 above) para 91.
74 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of 
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 12 April 2001 S/2001/357.
75 See (fn 7 above). Art 1(recognition of rights, duties and freedoms); art 2 (non-discrimination); art 
9(2) (opinion); art 10(1) (association); art 13 (participate in government); art 14 (property).
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culated to incite the citizens of Mauritania; and the respondent attempting to 
prove the converse. The Commission without giving reasons, stated that the 
state was right in contending that ‘the attitudes or declarations of the leaders 
of the dissolved party could indeed have violated the rights of individuals, the 
collective security of the Mauritanians and the common interest …’.
In making its decision, the Commission chose to focus on how far states 
may limit rights. From the Commission’s jurisprudence, article 27(2) of the 
Charter is considered to be the general limitation clause.76 States should not 
also use their national legislation by virtue of ‘claw back’ clauses to deprive 
rights provided in the Charter of meaning. Limitations to rights in order to 
conform to the provisions of the Charter, should be imposed ‘with due regard 
to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest, … 
based on a legitimate public interest and should be strictly proportionate with 
and absolutely necessary to the sought after objective’.77 The Commission 
found that the respondent had at its disposal various other sanctions without 
resorting to the dissolution of the party. As such, it had violated article 10(1) 
of the Charter.78
A similar observation was made in Prince v South Africa79 where the Com-
mission found that the state’s restriction on the complainant’s right to free-
dom of religion was justified in that ‘the right to hold religious beliefs should 
be absolute; the right to act on those beliefs should not’.80 Referring to article 
27(2) of the Charter, the Commission reiterated that rights could be limited 
,as long as such limitations were founded in legitimate state interest and were 
strictly proportionate and absolutely necessary to achieve the ends intended. 
The limitations imposed on the right to freedom of religion were found to 
conform to this standard. No violations were found in respect of the rights 
to occupational choice, dignity or culture, because the complainant could 
choose to accommodate the restrictions placed on the use of cannabis for the 
greater good of the society. 
3.3  Findings incongruent with alleged violations
It is intuitively expected that the Commission would find for or against viola-
tions of alleged rights, and that these violations would be alleged against a 
state. In the case of Rabah v Mauritania,81 the complainant alleged that he 
and his family were forcefully evicted from their ancestral domicile by one 
Mohammed Ould Bah who claimed ownership to the land on which the com-
plainant lived, on the basis that the complainant’s mother had donated the 
land before her death. The complainant alleged that the claim that Moham-
med Bah had over the land was that the complainant’s mother was Moham-
med Bah’s slave. The complainant used the judicial system in Mauritania 
to vindicate his claim to no avail. He then wrote to the highest authorities 
76 Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 ( ACHPR 1998) para 66
77 Interights and Others v Mauritania (fn 7 above) para 79 (footnotes omitted)
78 Para 85
79 (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004)
80 Para 41
81 See (fn 54 above).
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including the President of the Republic contesting what he perceived as the 
state’s support for slavery. The complainant thus alleged inter alia violation 
of his right to non-discrimination, equality, physical and moral integrity, dig-
nity and the prohibition of slavery.82 The Commission found that without an 
explanation of why the land was allegedly donated to Mohammed Ould Bah, 
the complainant’s right to property was violated.83
This is an interesting conclusion reached by the Commission particularly 
since the violator of the complainant’s right to property is presumably Mo-
hammed Ould Bah and not the respondent, also since there was no explicit 
allegation of a violation of this right in the first place.84 The complainant al-
leged discrimination in the enjoyment of rights, such as the right to property.85 
Assuming that the Commission did in reality intend on finding a violation of 
the complainant’s right to property, it is arguable that the Commission was, in 
effect, acting as a court of appeal from the decisions of the domestic courts. 
Concluding on the basis of inadequacy of evidence, that the dispossession 
of property was a rights violation was tantamount to reviewing the decisions 
of the domestic courts.86 It is not clear what the Commission is alluding to, 
when it mentions that the complainant lost the case at the domestic level due 
to ‘a weak judicial system and not on the basis of the practice of slavery or 
slave-like practices’, particularly because the Commission acknowledged that 
the complainant received all fair trial guarantees.87 The Commission failed to 
address itself to the alleged violations of other rights in the Charter, which if 
they had dealt with, may have provided a stronger basis on which to hold the 
state accountable.
The dissenting opinion focuses on the majority’s analysis of the issues in 
the communication and the admissibility of the communication. On the sub-
stance of the claim, Commissioner El Hassan dissented with the majority 
for several reasons. The allegation that the dispossession of property was as 
a consequence of slavery was not made in the proceedings at the domestic 
level. The Commission’s reliance on a translated summary of the documents 
may have led to the Commission’s failure to take note of this, as well as ac-
cepting the complainant’s allegations as fact. Entertaining new allegations in 
the communication placed the Commission in the position of a court of first 
instance. Commissioner El Hassan also took issue with the fact that the com-
plainant did not allege a violation of article 14 on which the decision of the 
majority was based. His argument was that the courts in Mauritania could 
not lawfully restrain the complainant’s mother from donating her property to 
a person of her choice, and a reason why such a donation takes place cannot 
be demanded in the absence of a legal prohibition on such a donation. 
82 The complainant alleged violations of art 2 (non-discrimination); art 3 (equality); art 4 (inviolability 
of the human being); art 5 (dignity, physical and moral integrity, prohibition against exploitation and 
degradation particularly slavery); art 6 (liberty and security); art 7 (right to have one’s cause heard 




86 See Njoku v Egypt (fn 63 above).
87 Rabah v Mauritania (fn 54 above) para 28
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Often, it is difficult to follow the legal reasoning behind decisions the Com-
mission arrives at; for example, in this case, it is not explicit in the decision 
how the Commission came to the conclusion that there was no violation of 
the rights alleged by the complainant, but the right to property, not specifi-
cally alleged, had been violated, simply because no reason for bequeathing 
the property to one person as opposed another was evident. The Commission 
should not hesitate to make findings against the complainants and for states 
where the evidence proffered does not support a finding of violation. 
3.4  Interpretation of international treaties
The Commission found in the inter-state communication that Rwanda and 
Uganda had perpetrated violations against DRC and civilians in the part of 
the DRC territory that they had occupied.88 The respondent states were found 
to have violated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of an-
other state; the failure to maintain international peace and security; and the 
violation of the right of the people of DRC to self-determination. The Com-
mission recommended that adequate reparations be paid for and on behalf of 
the victims of the atrocities committed.
In deciding this case, the Commission called to aid the interpretation claus-
es, articles 60 and 61, of the African Charter for guidance on peace and se-
curity issues, as well as humanitarian law principles. The Commission used 
the international law instruments it cited to draw principles of international 
law and establish their violation (where possible) simultaneously, with viola-
tions of the African Charter. Where acts committed did not expressly violate a 
Charter right, the Commission inferred violation nonetheless through invok-
ing articles 60 and 61 of the Charter.89 In this way the Commission exploited 
the utility of articles 60 and 61 to illustrate the extent to which the respondent 
states had acted inconsistently with their international law obligations (in 
this case the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols), even where no 
express violation of the Charter could be found on a particular set of facts. 
The use of articles 60 and 61 not only as an aid to establishing principles of 
international law, but further, as a basis for inferring violations of instruments 
other than the Charter is innovative, but also casts the net wide, in that the 
Commission did not consider the ratification status of the states vis-à-vis the 
instruments it considered to be ‘special international conventions’ within the 
meaning of the Charter. The implication of this is that states can be found to 
have violated rights enshrined in instruments that they have not ratified on 
the basis of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter.90 
88 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (fn 4 above)
89 The besieging of the hydroelectric dam in Lower Congo province is found to be a violation of The 
Hague Convention (II) with Respect of the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 23 and therefore 
by invoking article 60 and 61, are in violation of the African Charter. DRC v Burundi and Others (fn 
4 above) para 84.
90 cf African Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guin-
ea) v Guinea (fn 43 above) para 41 where the Commission finds a violation of the OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa of 1969, but specifically mentions that Guinea 
has ratified this and other relevant treaties.
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The findings of the Commission are in tandem with similar conclusions 
reached by the International Court of Justice which delivered its judgment 
against Uganda on 19 December 2005.91 The ICJ found Uganda in violation 
inter alia of the principle of non-use of force in international relations and 
the principle of non-intervention; in violation of its obligations under inter-
national human rights law and international humanitarian law; in violation 
of obligations owed to the DRC under international law in relation to the 
plundering of its natural resources; and that Uganda was under an obligation 
to make reparation to the DRC for injury caused.
3.5  African Commission vis-à-vis Domestic Courts
The African Commission being an international adjudicatory body insists on 
considering communications only after domestic legal remedies have been 
exhausted. This is in recognition of the sovereignty of states and their pre-
rogative to an opportunity to redress alleged violations within their territory 
before external intervention. The Commission restated its supervisory role at 
the supranational level in the case discussed below.
3.5.1  Prince v South Africa92 
This communication alleged the violations of the complainant’s rights to dig-
nity, conscience and religion, work and culture,93 emphasising the interrelat-
edness of what are often referred to as first and second generation rights. The 
complainant belonged to the Rastafari religion and claimed that the use of 
cannabis was an integral part of the practice of this religion. When he applied 
to the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope for registration of a contract of 
community service in order to qualify as an attorney, as part of the legal re-
quirement, he disclosed two previous convictions for possession of cannabis 
and his intention to continue using cannabis as part of his religious observ-
ance. He was, as a result, denied registration of his contract for not being a 
‘fit and proper person’ to be admitted as an attorney. 
The complainant made a case for exemption from the laws that criminal-
ised possession and use of cannabis in order to accommodate the use of can-
nabis for religious purposes. He claimed that by proscribing the use of can-
nabis, the relevant law brings within its scope use of the drug for legitimate 
religious purposes, thereby infringing on rights. He was not advocating for a 
complete lifting of the ban on cannabis, rather a reasonable allowance of its 
use for genuine religious purposes.
The state in response emphasised that placing limitations on rights did not 
necessarily mean that those rights were not available to the complainant. 
The limitations placed on the right to freedom of religion in this case were 
reasonable and legitimate and did not infringe on the right further than was 
necessary. The state denied that the limitations to this right denied the com-
91 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) Interna-
tional Court of Justice Judgment of 19 December 2005
92 (Fn 79 above)
93 Arts 5, 8, 15 and 17(2) of the Charter
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plainant the right to take part in the Rastafarian cultural life. With regard to 
professional choice, it was submitted that the complainant’s choice not to 
adhere to the relevant laws were what resulted in the denial of registration. 
Attorneys were obliged to uphold and obey the law.
With regard to the general consideration of the case, the respondent was 
of the view that it had been carefully considered by the domestic judicial 
system, the case having reached the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the 
highest court able to determine constitutional issues. The respondent urged 
the Commission in its decision to bear in mind the role of tribunals at the 
international level (including the Commission) vis-à-vis the national courts, 
that this role should be ‘subsidiary, … narrower and supervisory … in sub-
sequently reviewing a state’s choice of action against standards set by the 
provisions of the African Charter’.94 The margin of appreciation doctrine was 
also invoked by the state, claiming that a certain level of discretion should be 
afforded to the state in the implementation and application of human rights 
standards and norms, based on the state’s familiarity with the dynamics of 
its society.95 To contradict, therefore, the decision of the national courts in 
this case would lead to conflicts between the national and international legal 
systems.
The Commission acknowledged that the principles of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation doctrine were relevant to its work of giving effect to 
Charter rights. However, it disagreed with the narrow scope of its role as per-
ceived by the respondent, seeing such a narrow scope as having the effect of 
ousting the Commission’s mandate. The Commission cited the requirement 
for the exhaustion of local remedies, as well as the latitude afforded in some 
provisions of the Charter through which states could limit rights, as manifes-
tations of the two principles in the Commission’s work.
The express recognition of the subsidiarity principle and margin of appreci-
ation doctrine in the work of the Commission presents it with an opportunity 
to further develop the rules which guide the application of these principles. 
It is evident from the Commission’s response to these issues, that the lines 
are hazy that demarcate the supervisory mandate of the Commission from 
the sphere within which national courts operate. The Commission is also evi-
dently, and to its credit, prepared to robustly defend what it perceives as its 
mandate to monitor and oversee the implementation of the African Charter. 
However, it failed to clearly enunciate what that mandate entails in relation 
to these principles and therefore set straight the uncertainty as to the extent 
of discretion allowed to states. 
3.6  Fair trial
The cases below illustrate the Commission’s role at the international level of 
ensuring that the rights in the Charter are upheld within national jurisdictions 
even where it means delving into domestic court procedure. 
94 Para 37
95 Ibid.
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3.6.1  Odjouoriby v Benin96 
The complainant alleged that he was denied justice by virtue of the prolonged 
duration which a case had been pending at the Appeal Court in Cotonou. The 
Commission found a violation of article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter, which 
protects the right to be tried within a reasonable time.97 The complainant 
alleged that an appeal filed with the Appeal Court in September 1995 had 
not been disposed by the time the Commission was seized of the matter in 
April 1997. It is interesting that the Commission applied this article to civil 
proceedings in this case, whereas the article is more often applied in criminal 
proceedings. The Commission elected not to determine whether there was a 
violation to the right to property, which was the subject matter of the proceed-
ings in the Court of Appeal, as this would have amounted to the Commission 
pre-empting a decision by the national courts on the issue.
3.6.2  Interights & Others v Mauritania98
The Commission assessed the arguments of the parties with a view to estab-
lishing whether the right to a fair trial had been violated by the state. The 
complainant alleged that the proceedings violated the right of appeal, the 
principle of audi alteram partem and the final judgment did not sufficiently 
legally justify the dissolution of the party. The state on its part argued that it 
had complied with article 7(1)(a) of the Charter because the competent na-
tional organ to determine matters concerning political parties was the Admin-
istrative Chamber of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest 
authority in Mauritania and, therefore, no appeal lies to any other court. On 
the issue of hearing, the state alleged that the complainants had the opportu-
nity to present their written or oral submissions before the court, an opportu-
nity they did not take advantage of. The Commission, in the result, held that 
the complainant’s right to a fair trial had not been violated.99
3.6.3  Women’s Legal Aid Centre (on behalf of Moto) v Tanzania100 
In this case the Commission was faced with the task of pronouncing on 
whether court procedure met the standards set in the African Charter. The 
complainant, Sophia Moto, approached the Commission after a civil suit she 
had filed at the High Court of Tanzania was dismissed without a hearing 
when neither she nor her advocate appeared before the court on the date set 
for hearing. A review of this decision came to naught, and by applying for 
review of the order in the same court, she was precluded from appealing the 
dismissal decision to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. She alleged that this 
procedure of dismissal denied her the right to have her case heard, as well as 
her right to property which was the substantive issue in her civil suit.101
96 (Fn 7 above)
97 Odjouoriby v Benin (fn 7 above) para 30
98 (Fn 7 above)
99 Para 47
100 (Fn 38 above)
101  African Charter art 7 (right to be heard); art 14 (property)
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The complainant alleged that she was not at any time issued with summons 
or a notice of hearing and thus, she was unaware of the hearing date. Her 
advocate was present at the setting of the hearing date but failed to advise 
her of that date. By dismissing the case for non-appearance she was being 
punished whereas the mistake that led to non-appearance was attributable to 
her counsel. The complainant thereby suffered a violation of her right to have 
her suit heard as well as her right to matrimonial property vindicated. 
The respondent state was of the view that the court could not be faulted for 
dismissing the suit since the complainant’s legal representative was present 
at the setting of the date. The complainant had grounds to proceed against 
her attorney for the failure to appear in court on the hearing date, rather than 
placing the blame on the courts. The court acted within the provisions of 
the Civil Procedure Code and it was rather the complainant who had failed 
to follow procedure. The respondent stated that the complainant had failed 
to adduce evidence on her right to property though the right to property is 
recognised by the state. 
The Commission was of the view that although the Civil Procedure Code 
allowed for the dismissal of a suit for non-appearance, the relevant provisions 
did not impose a mandatory duty on the courts to dismiss such suits, and in 
addition the provisions allowed for the plaintiff to contest such dismissal and 
have it set aside. The decision to dismiss the suit without hearing it resulted 
in uncertainty over the complainant’s rights which were to be determined in 
the suit. Procedural rules were held to be central to the realisation of substan-
tive laws and, therefore, for rights to be given effect, procedures had to be ap-
plied in a just manner. The Commission perceived its role as supervisory over 
procedures that states have enacted. Should these procedures not facilitate 
the enjoyment of rights, the state would be found in violation.
Accordingly, Tanzania was found in violation of article 7(1)(a); failure to 
ensure the right to a hearing due to procedural rules where discretion was 
exercised contrary to the requirements of the African Charter and the rules 
of natural justice. The Commission urged Tanzania to apply its rules of pro-
cedure without fear or favour and allow the complainant to be heard on ap-
peal.
3.7  Administrative capacity
Some of the pervasive criticisms of the African Commission relate to its weak 
administrative capacity, resulting in part from the lack of adequate funding. 
The reach of this particular weakness is evident in the outcome of commu-
nications, and should provide impetus for correction to eliminate negative 
outcomes on the administration of justice.
Underlying the issues raised in the dissenting opinion in Rabah v Maurita-
nia, is the question of the capacity of the Commission to work in Arabic (one 
of the working languages of the Commission) the language in which most 
of the communication documents were submitted.102 The dissenting opinion 
102 (Fn 54 above)
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states that the Commission worked only on an inaccurately translated sum-
mary of part of the documents.103
4  CONCLUSION 
The communications decided in 2004 by the African Commission exposed a 
variety of issues that point to the need for the Commission to strengthen both 
its consideration of substantive questions as well as administrative capac-
ity to handle cases, as the latter has an impact on the former. In admitting 
complaints the exhaustion of local remedies has been shown to be by far the 
most prominent criterion for admission, but it should not overshadow the 
development of jurisprudence on other criteria. The Commission also needs 
to make clear its position on evidence, whether and to what extent it will 
verify facts, since these facts invariably form the crux of cases, and failure 
to give evidence due consideration may result in the miscarriage of justice. 
The weighing of evidence obviously needs to be balanced with the Commis-
sion’s role at the international level and the caution it must exercise so as 
not to appear as an extension of the domestic legal system. The utilisation 
of the interpretation clauses in the African Charter to find violations of other 
international treaties similarly needs to be further elaborated on in particular 
to delimit the extent the which the clauses are useful. As it is now, it appears 
that states can be found in violation of rights enshrined in treaties that they 
have not ratified.104 
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